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Article 1

Contribution Among Antitrust Violators: A
Question of Legal Process

C. Douglas Floyd*
The statutory scheme of the federal antitrust laws expressly
provides for a variety of remedies in both government and private actions, including criminal penalties,' civil actions by the
United States for injunction and damages,' private actions for
treble damages and injunctive relief: and actions "parens patriae" by state attorneys general seeking damages sustained on
behalf of natural persons residing in the state.' Unlike the federal securities acts, however,' the remedial provisions of the antitrust laws contain no authorization for those held liable for
damages on account of violations of the antitrust laws to seek
contribution from others who allegedly are jointly liable for the
same wrong.
Until recently, the courts had uniformly held or assumed
that no right to contribution existed under the federal antitrust
laws? This was in accordance with the long-standing federal
common law rule announced in Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad7 that "one of several
wrongdoers cannot recover against another wrongdoer, although
he may have been compelled to pay all the damages for the
wrong done.'" But in 1979, antitrust defendants, inspired in part
by what they perceived as a growing "trend" in the federal
* B.S., 1964, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; LL.B., 1967, Stanford University School of Law. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University.
1. 15 U.S.C. QQ 1, 2 (1976).
2. Id. QQ 15(a), 25.
3. Id. §Q 15, 26.
4. Id. Q 15~-15h.
5. Id. $5 77k(f), 78i(e), 78r(b).
6. See, e.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglow Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 772,110 (N.D.
Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339,
1343-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Schubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616-17 (3d Cir. 1960)
(dictum).
7. 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
8. Id. a t 224.
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courts toward allowing contribution among defendants in a variety of contexts, made new efforts to establish a right to contribution under the antitrust laws as a matter of federal common
law. These efforts resulted in conflicting decisions on the question in the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, and a renewal of
scholarly criticism and interest.@
By virtue of the grant of certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit's decision in Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v.
Texas Industries, Inc.,1° which declined to create a new federal
common-law right of antitrust contribution, this important
question of legal process and judicial administration is now destined for decision by the United States Supreme Court. It is the
thesis of this Article, contrary to the general view of the commentary to date, that when that Court does have occasion to
hear and decide the issue, it should reaffirm the long-standing
rule that there is no common-law right of contribution under the
federal antitrust laws. It should do so because the considerations
of equity and fairness that constitute the primary basis for a
contribution right are far less compelling in the context of pricefixing and other conspiratorial violations of the antitrust laws
than in the cases of negligence and strict liability in tort, where
such rights have previously been recognized (primarily by legislative enactment). Of equal importance, the creation of a right of
contribution could so impair the policies of deterrence and compensation underlying the scheme of private antitrust remedies
enacted by the Congress that only a far clearer showing of injustice than has yet been forthcoming would support the intrusion
of the judiciary into the sphere of distribution of damages in an9. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1979); Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1979); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 71 76,699
(10th Cir. 1979) (petition for rehearing en banc granted Dec. 27, 1979). See generally
Littman & Van Buskirk, The "Dogmas" of Antitrust Actions: A New Perspective, 24
ANTITRUSTBULL.687 (1979); Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 33 S.W.L.J. 779 (1979); Note, Contribution in
Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL
L. REV.682 (1978); Note,Contribution in Private
Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV.L. REV. 1540 (1980); Note, Contribution Among Private
Antitrust Conspirators, 10 MEM.ST. U.L. REV.342 (1980). For earlier commentary, see
Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution Among Coconspirators in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM
L. REV.111 (1962); Paul, Contribution and
Indemnification Among Antitrust Coconspirators Revisited, 41 FORDHAM
L. REV.67
(1972).
10. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radc l 8 e Materials, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (Od.31, 1980).
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titrust cases, which has to date been the province of the legislative branch.

In Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. u. National Beauty
Supply, Inc.,ll the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit became the first federal court to recognize a right
of contribution among antitrust violators. Professional, a wholesaler of beauty supplies, alleged that National, another wholesaler, had induced Professional's manufacturer-supplier, La
Maur, Inc., to terminate its relationship with Professional and
grant National an exclusive dealership for La Maur's products in
Minnesota. National's conduct was alleged to constitute a monopolization or an attempt to monopolize in violation of section
2 of the Sherman Act." National filed a third-party complaint
against La Maur alleging that La Maur had solicited National to
become a distributor of La Maur's products, and that in the
event National were held liable to Professional, it would be entitled to contribution from La Maur for at least one-half of any
ultimate recovery. The district court granted La M a d s motion
to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the
third-party complaint. A majority of the panel held "that under
certain circumstances an antitrust defendant may be entitled to
pro rata contribution from other joint tortfeasors."lS The majority reviewed at length the various policy reasons that have been
advanced in opposition to the judicial creation of a right of contribution under the antitrust laws1' and concluded that none of
these arguments outweighed what the court viewed as the dispositive factor: "The deciding factor in our decision is fairness
between the parties. We conclude that fairness requires that the
right of contribution exist among joint tortfeasors at least under
11. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
12. Id. at 1181. Professional also asserted pendent state-law claims.
13. Id. at 1182 (footnotes omitted).
14. These policy reasons included, among others, the question of congressional intent, the danger of unduly complicating antitrust litigation, the fear of deterring settlements under the antitrust laws, and the diminution of the deterrent effect of the private
treble damages remedy.
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certain circumstances."I6
In Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc.,16 a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. The Fifth Circuit majority believed that judicial recognition of a right of contribution among antitrust
violators, particularly intentional violators, might frustrate the
deterrent effect of the antitrust laws by unduly complicating antitrust litigation and by permitting a violator to spread his losses
among a large number of defendants.17 The majority reasoned
that "a rule prohibiting contribution among antitrust coconspirators not only does not frustrate deterrence but may very well
enhance the statutes' deterrent effect by preventing a defendant
from cutting its losses,"18 and that judicial recognition of a right
of contribution "may open a Pandora's box of procedural
problems, against which district court discretion may prove a
palliation.'"@ Although the court recognized "reasonable contrary arguments" it concluded:
In this area of interstitial lawmaking, however, to forge a
new rule with questionable benefits and such possible detriments is a bad practice. Those aggrieved by this decision always have recourse to Congress, a forum better suited to evaluation of the competing interests and policies involved.40

In Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract C O . ,a~different
~
Fifth
Circuit panel applied that circuit's Abraham Construction decision to deny any right of contribution in favor of nonsettling defendants against other defendants in the same action who had
settled the plaintiffs' claims against them.
, ~ ~
Finally, in Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, I ~ c .the
Tenth Circuit, in yet another divided panel opinion, concluded
with respect to the competing policies involved: "[IJt can be seen
that there are strong offsetting arguments over the contribution
issue. We regard as mere speculation the forecast that, if the
15. 594 F.2d at 1185.
16. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
17. Id. at 900-05. In Abraturrn Construction, the defendants, alleged price-fixers,
sought to file third party complaints against alleged coconspirators not named as
defendants.
18. Id. at 903 (footnote omitted).
19. Id. at 906.
20. Id.
21. No. 79-2439 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979) (unpublished opinion), cert. granted, 100 S.
Ct. 3008 (1980), cert. dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3288 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
22. 1979-2 Trade Cas. 8 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979).
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question were presented, Congress would include a right to contribution as part of the antitrust laws."23 The majority reasoned
that questions regarding the effect such a new right would have
on the workability and fairness of the statutory private treble
damage remedy were not suited to judicial resolution:
Before entering such a complex policy thicket, but recognizing a possible exception in the case of an unintentional violator, we believe this court should await a clear signal, at least,
from the legislative branch of our government on the matter.
Certainly, the Congress, assisted by the resources of the executive branch, is in a far superior and more appropriate position
to gauge the impact on observance and enforcement of the antitrust laws from contribution and its various facets of
implernentati~n.~~

On June 16,1980, the United States Supeme Court granted
certiorari in the Fifth Circuit Westvaco case, presumably for the
purpose of resolving the conflict in the circuits.25The question
presented by the petition for certiorari was "[wlhether defenThe
dants in antitrust cases may assert rights of contrib~tion."~~
petitioners in Westvaco were three of thirty-seven corrugated
container manufacturers who were named defendants in consolidated class-action antitrust treble damage complaints alleging a
nationwide conspiracy to fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize the
23. Id. at 79,703.
24. Id. at 79,703-04 (footnote omitted). In the Olson Farms case, Olson, was sued by
fourteen egg producers which alleged that it had engaged in a conspiracy to fix the prices
paid the producers for their eggs at an artificially low level in violation of section 1of the
Sherman Act, and that it had conspired to monopolize the distribution of eggs in violation of section 2 of that act. Olson Farms' alleged conspirators were not identified by the
complaint, but the evidence at trial tended to establish that some ninety percent of the
sales of eggs for which damages were sought from Olson had not been sales to Olson, but
had been sales to the other alleged conspirators. Id. at 79,700. Unlike the defendants in
the Professional Beauty Supply and Abraham Construction cases, Olson made no effort
to file third party complaints against the other alleged conspirators in the original antitrust action, but proceeded to trial alone. The jury returned a verdict against Olson
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and assessed damages, which, after trebling,
amounted to almost $2 million. The decision was later affirmed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541
F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976). In Olson Farms, it was only after the entry of judgment on the
jury verdict against it in the original antitrust case that Olson determined to seek contribution through an independent action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah against five asserted coconspirators on account of whose purchases of eggs
damages had allegedly been assessed against Olson in the first trial.
25. 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980).
26. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 100 S.
Ct. 3008 (1980).
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prices of corrugated containers and sheets." Certain class representatives estimated treble damages to be as high as $5.9 billion.
Following certification, more than twenty of the defendants settled plaintiffs' claims against them for sums aggregating in excess of $300 million. The three petitioners in the Westuaco case,
however, did not settle. Faced with joint and several liability alleged to be in excess of five billion dollars, they instead sought
to file contribution cross-claims against the settling defendants,
together with an affirmative defense alleging that plaintiffs'
claim should be reduced in an amount fairly allocable to the settling defendants' conduct ("claim reduction")? The district
court denied the motions to assert contribution cross-claims and
claim reduction defenses. The court of appeals affirmed as to
contribution, but held that the order with respect to petitioners'
claim reduction defense was not immediately appealable because
no Rule 54(b) certificate had been entered with respect to it.
The petition for certiorari was based on petitioners' claim
that they faced "unfair settlement coercion" as a result of their
exposure to joint and several liability for the entire damages to
the class. They claimed that "the pressures created by the enormous damage exposure resulted in an unprecedented five-week
settlement 'stampede' " and that "with each successive settlement during the stampede, plaintiffs demanded and received
amounts at a higher rate than prior settlements without regard
to the merits of their claims. . . . Plaintiffs were able to escalate
their settlement demands because in the absence of contribution
the exposure faced by each nonsettling defendant is increased
with each successive ~ettlernent."~~
The grant of certiorari in the Westuaco case was peculiar.
Virtually all authorities are now in agreement that it is inappropriate to allow contribution against a settling defendant even
under statutes expressly providing for a right of contribution.
Although the Westuaco petitioners could have made a substantial argument with respect to their defense of claim reduction on
account of the settlements, that issue was not before the Supreme Court since it was not subject to appeal to the Fifth Circuit and therefore was not passed upon by that court. Accordingly, Westvaco provided a poor occasion for passing upon the
27. Id. at 2-3.
28. Id. at 4-5.
29. Id. at 3-4.
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contribution issue, for it was unlikely that the Supreme Court
would have recognized a right of contribution against settling
defendants, particularly where that right would have represented a radical departure from existing law which would have
been retroactively applied to upset legitimate expectations of
the settling defendants that they had bought their peace.'O
These concerns became moot, however, when, subsequent to
the grant of certiorari in Westvaco, the three nonsettling petitioners themselves settled the actions against them. The Supreme Court then granted respondents' motions to dismiss the
writ of certiorari on the ground that the circumstances on which
the petitions had been based were fundamentally altered, and
because petitioners, as settling defendants, no longer claimed
that contribution from settlors should be available." As previously noted, however, the Court thereupon granted certiorari to
review the Fifth Circuit's Abraham Construction decision, which
at this writing is pending before the Court for oral argument and
decision in the spring of 1981.8aThat decision squarely presents
the antitrust contribution issue free of the complexities engendered by the immediate presence of settlements.
The settlement issue cannot be ignored, however, because,
as I will point out, much of the debate regarding the creation of
a new right of antitrust contribution centers around its impact
on the workability and fairness of the antitrust settlement process. Despite its other shortcomings, the Westvaco case at least
would have had the virtue of focusing the Supreme Court's attention on that fact. We may hope that the implications of its
Abraham Construction decision for the settlement process will
30. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Moreover, as pointed out in
the brief of certain respondents in opposition to the petition:
Petitioners . . . argue the financial hardships faced by several small settling
defendants who are asserted to be marginally profitable . . . . Yet, it is these
very same settling defendants who would be most injured by a rule permitting
contribution. If contribution were permitted, these settling defendants, who,
according to Petitioners, have been "coerced["] or driven to the edge of bankruptcy, would be forced to pay just that much more! Thus it is contribution
which in this context could be used by larger nonsettling defendants as a coercive anticompetitive device to drive their smaller competitors out of the
marketplace.
Brief of Respondents-Plaintiffs in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11
(footnote omitted).
31. 49 U.S.L.W. 3288 (Oct. 20, 1980).
32. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. RadclifFe Materials, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (Oct. 31, 1980).
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not escape the Court's attention.
Interest in the antitrust contribution issue has also been
heightened by proposals for legislation dealing both with the basic right of contribution itself and with the corollary of
mandatory reduction of plaintiffs' claims against nonsettling defendants on account of damages fairly attributable to the settling defendants. On July 9, 1979, Senator Bayh introduced S.
1468, which would provide for the first time a statutory right of
contribution limited to price-fixing actions only, with the contribution shares among defendants determined "according to the
damages attributable to each such person's sales or purchases of
goods or servi~es."~
Contribution could be asserted on behalf of
both settling and nonsettling defendants, whether by crossclaim, counter-claim, or third-party claim in the original antitrust action, or by separate action after judgment. In accordance
with the prevailing view, a tortfeasor settling in good faith would
be discharged from all liability of contribution, but the plaintiffs' claims against the remaining defendants would be automatically reduced by the greatest of the amount of consideration
paid for the settlement, the amount stipulated therein, or
"treble the actual damages attributable to the settling person's
sales or purchases of goods or servi~es."~
The statute would apply prospectively only to actions commenced after the date of its
enactment.
The American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law has
also drafted proposed contribution legislation. Unlike Senator
Bayh's proposal, it would not be limited to price-fixing actions,
but would apply to any antitrust violation. The contribution
share would be determined, not on the basis of the defendants'
sales or purchases, but instead "in accordance with the relative
responsibility of each party for the damages awarded in the
main action."s6 Presumably this contemplates some assessment
of relative fault as well as impact on the plaintiff. Contribution
is barred both in favor of and against settling tortfeasors, but
the plaintiffs rights against the nonsettlors are subject to
mandatory reduction in accordance with the settlors' contribution shares determined in accordance with their "relative re33. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. $ 4I(a) (1979).
34. Id. $3 4I(b)-~I(c).
35. AMERICANBARASSOCIATION,
REPORT
OF SECTION
OF ANTITRUST
LAW WITH LECISLA^ RECOMMENDATION
11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORTOF SECTION
OF ANTITRUST

LAW].
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sponsibility," or, in the alternative, plaintiff may elect to "remove" the settlers' acts from his theory of liability."

The courts and commentators have identified several primary issues of policy relevant to the determination whether to
recognize -a right of contribution under the antitrust laws. They
are (1)the impact of such a right on the deterrent effect of the
private treble damages remedy; (2) the closely related question
of whether such a right would frustrate the purposes of the congressionally created treble damage remedy by additionally complicating antitrust litigation which is already exceedingly complex, and which imposes a very substantial burden both on
federal courts and on litigants; (3) the effect of such a right on
the settlement of antitrust cases; and, (4) the question whether
considerations of fairness and equity support the creation of a
right of contribution among antitrust conspirators. None of
these questions are susceptible of easy resolution.
A. Deterrence
In the Professional Beauty Supply decision, which judicially created a right of contribution under the antitrust laws for
the first time, the Eighth Circuit majority rejected arguments
that such a decision would decrease the deterrent effect of the
private treble damage remedy. The court concluded that "the
question of deterrence actually cuts both ways and on balance a
rule allowing conbibution is actually a greater deterrent."s7 The
panel majority believed that the rule denying contribution necessarily meant that other coconspirators might go "scot free,"
and stated, "This possibility of escaping all liability might cause
many to be more willing rather than less willing, to engage in
wrongful activity."" The majority also noted that a powerful
and culpable antitrust violator, particularly one that has contin36. The ABA's proposed statute also provides a statute of limitations for contribution claims requiring that they be filed within one year of the date of service of original
complaint or within 60 days after the contribution claimant is on notice of his potential
liability based on damages caused in whole or in part by the acts or omissions of another,
or, in any event, within 60 days after the entry of final judgment in the district court. Id.
at 10.
37. 594 F.2d at 1185.
38. Id.
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uing business dealings with the plaintiff, might be in a position
to exert its economic influence to ensure that it was never sued,
thus casting the entire burden of liability on less culpable parties? In sum, "to deny contribution would be to dilute the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws, since a participant in an antitrust violation could escape all responsibility for its wrongdoing."'O
Similarly, the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on
S. 1468 concluded that there would be no reduction of deterrence through creation of a right to contribution, on the theory
that "treble damages is a significant penalty, even for a company's proportionate share attributable to participation in a
price-fixing ~onspiracy,"~~
and argued that under the present law
the biggest and most culpable defendants often obtain discounted or "bargain" settlements and thus pay much less than
their fair share of liability."
There would appear to be little basis logically or empirically
for the conclusion that creating a right of contribution would enh n c e the deterrent effect of the private treble damage remedy.
Although it is true that, after the fact, the rule against contribution may permit an antitrust violator who has not been sued by
an injured plaintiff to escape liability altogether, there would be
no way for such a defendant to predict that eventuality in advance. The deterrent effect of the treble damage remedy must
be assessed at the time the forbidden conduct is undertaken, not
with an ex post facto view of where liability ultimately happened to come to rest.
Morever, there is little reason to fear that private, treble
damage plaintiffs will deliberately exclude large or culpable defendants from their action, leaving "innocent" small companies
to bear the entire burden of liability. An injured plaintiff would
be most likely to select the most culpable and financially responsible defendant for his lawsuit in order to enhance the chances
both of a determination of liability and of the ultimate recovery
of damages?
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. S. FW.NO.428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REWRT].
42. Id.
43. See REP~RTOF SECTION
OF AN~RusTLAW, supra note 35, at 6.
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In Abraham Constr~ction,~~
the court concluded, contrary
to the reasoning of Professional Beauty Supply, that the "very
possibility of imposition of sole liability has an enhanced deterrent effect."45 The court referred to economic studies tending to
establish that managers of large organizations are "risk averse"
and are therefore deterred more by the "slight prospect of a
~ ~ the
large loss than by the strong prospect of a small 1 0 ~ s . "And
court recognized that deterrence should be determined before,
not after the fact: "[Dleterrence does not suffer if contribution is
denied since a real threat of liability exists for all participants in
the illegal scheme-any one of them could have been selected as
the defendant in the plaintiffs action."47
In his testimony on Senator Bayh's proposed contribution
legislation, the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division summarized the conflicting empirical possibilities and expressed his concern about the impact of a contribution right on
the workability and deterrent effect of the private treble damage
remedy:
Permitting contribution in antitrust cases could have either of two consequences for deterrence resulting from private
treble damage actions. It could increase the deterrent effect by
making it more likely that all members of an antitrust conspiracy will be sued by somebody-either by the plaintiff or by a
defendant seeking contribution-or it could decrease the deterrent effect by both lowering each antitrust conspirator's potential liability and allowing each conspirator to assess more fully
in advance his full potential exposure, thereby making the
cost-benefit analysis of whether to enter into an antitrust violation more predictable. I am not able to say that one of these
possible effects will predominate in all antitrust cases under all
possible circumstances; nobody could. But I think we should
44. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
45. Id. at 901.
46. Id. at 901 n.8.

47. Id. at 903 n.11. The Abraham Construction majority concluded that even in the
case of "unintentional" violators of the antitrust laws, the rule denying contribution
might enhance the deterrent effect of the treble damage remedy because
even businesses of the purest motives necessarily steer wide of any conduct the
effects of which may violate the law, in the knowledge that full, trebled damages possibly await even an unintentional transgression. Allowing contribution
may diminish this prophylactic, chilling effect by reducing the threatening
specter of sole liability. Businesses may be encouraged to risk anticompetitive
conduct secure in the knowledge that proof of illegal purpose is often impossible and that liability for illegal effects will be dissipated.
Id. at 905.
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look closely at whether contribution would weaken antitrust
deterrence where it is needed most, in conspiracies to fix
prices.

....

I think the point here is that I am not certain whether
conclusions regarding contribution and deterrence developed in
other areas of the law can be readily applied to all types of
conspiratorial conduct found in antitrust cases?

In fashioning a new right of contribution in antitrust cases,
the Professional Beauty Supply majority relied in part on the
Supreme Court's opinion in Perma Mufflers v. International
Parts Gorp.,'@ which held that the common-law defense of in
pari delicto may not be applied routinely to bar persons injured
by an antitrust violation from recovery because they have them. ~ ~ Proselves participated in the alleged antitrust v i o l a t i ~ nThe
fessional Beauty Supply court reasoned that contribution
should be allowed in antitrust cases because in Perma Mufflers
"the Supreme Court cautioned against broad application of common-law doctrines to prevent recovery if such application will
defeat important public purpo~es.''~~
The Professional Beauty
Supply court was convinced that "the result of automatically
48. Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1979)
(prepared statement of John Shenefield) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
Two recent advocates of the judicial creation of a right of contribution have criticized the view that, ex ante, antitrust deterrence may be increased by the prospect that
the entire burden of joint and several liability may fall upon a single defendant, on the
ground that "severity alone has not been accepted as a modern theory of deterrence"
and that "to the extent that severity of the sanction is important, Congress has determined that antitrust sanctions shall be criminal punishments, treble damage actions, equitable relief, and attorneys' fees for the successful private plaintiff. . . . Judicial increase of these severities is gratuitous, and is not justified on a theory of deterrence."
Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 744 (emphasis added). They argue that they
"do not accept the notion that the innocent should be oppressed in order that the guilty
may suffer." Id. at 745. But these observations seem somewhat wide of the problem at
hand. The question is not one of "judicial increase" of the penalties that Congress has
provided. The courts have concluded that Congress intended for the traditional rule of
joint and several liability to be applicable to the private treble damage remedy. Thus,
the question more appropriately is whether the courts should undertake the process of
lessening the severity of the remedies that Congress has provided. Similarly, there is no
question here of oppressing the "innocent." The issue is whether a party who has been
adjudicated by a jury's verdict to be an antitrust conspirator should be entitled to spread
his loss among his co-wrongdoers.
49. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
50. Id. at 138-40.
51. 594 F.2d at 1185.
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.

prohibiting contribution among antitrust defendants . . would
be to allow a significant number of antitrust violators to escape
liability for their wrongdoing and thereby undermine the policy
of the antitrust laws."52
This analysis, however, overlooks the fundamental distinction between the issue in Perrna Mufflers and the question of
creation of a right of contribution. In Perrna Mufflers, the plaintiffs were Midas Mufeer dealers who charged in their complaint
that their franchisor had conspired with its parent corporation
and other defendants to require the dealers to purchase their
supplies exclusively from the defendants, to prevent them from
selling outside designated territories, and to fix resale prices.5s
There was thus no question that the plaintiffs fell within the
terms of section 4 of the Clayton Act which provides that "[alny
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue [to] recover
three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."54 An antitrust coconspirator, however, is not an injured purchaser or consumer of
goods or services who possesses a cause of action under section 4
of the Clayton Act.56 It is an antitrust violator whose conduct
has caused such damages to others. The holding of Perma Mufflers, that the federal courts should not import from other areas
of the law "broad common-law barriers to relief' to preclude a
right of action that the Congress has expressly conferred, hardly
impels the conclusion that the federal courts should import new
common-law doctrines to create a right of recovery where Congress has failed to .do so.*
52. Id.
53. 392 U.S. at 137.
54. 15 U.S.C. 8 15 (1976).
55. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262, 265 (1972).
56. There is another reason why the Perma Mufflerscase provides little support to
the conclusion that the federal courts should create a general right of contribution in
antitrust cases. Even if an antitrust coconspirator did possess a right of action under 1 4
of the Clayton Act, a majority of the court in Perma Mufflersmade it clear that an active
antitrust violator is barred from any recovery under the antitrust laws. Justice Black's
opinion noted that under the facts of that case, the participation of the plaintiffs in the
alleged violation through their signature on the Midas Dealer Agreement "was not voluntary in any meaningful sense," 392 U.S. at 139, and that "once it is shown that the
plaintiff did not aggressively support and further the monopolistic scheme . . . his understandable attempts to make the best of a bad situation should not be a ground for
completely denying him the right to recover which the antitrust acts give him." Id. at
140 (emphasis added). Justice White's concurring opinion noted that recovery should be
denied where plaintiff and defendant "bear substantially equal responsibility for injury
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On balance, the arguments on the deterrence point are inconclusive. As illustrated by the diametrically opposed conclusions on this issue in Abraham Construction and Professional
Beauty Supply, the courts that have considered the matter have
been in no position to determine empirically the effects on antitrust deterrence of continuing the current prohibition against
contribution or of fashioning a new rule of contribution. And if
the courts were to create a new right of antitrust contribution,
they would be in no position to analyze empirically the different
effects that various possible contribution rules would have. Such
questions would appear more suitable for resolution by the legislative than by the judicial process.

B. Complexity of Antitrust Litigation
A concern closely related to the deterrence issue in the debate over creation of a right of antitrust contribution has been
its impact in making what is already exceedingly complex and
burdensome litigation even more complex and burdensome.
Massive antitrust cases have already created problems of judicial
administration in our federal courts. This has become an era of
nationwide class actions under Rule 23 in which parties are
seeking damages aggregating in the millions and even billions of
dollars. As two commentators have recently noted:
Private antitrust class action complaints filed on behalf of
thousands of purchasers, naming as defendants most of the
manufacturers in an entire industry, have now become common. They allege in very general terms that the defendants
conspired to fix, raise, maintain or stabilize prices; that the
conspiracy caused injury and damages to the class over a peresulting to one of them." Id. at 146. Justice Fortas stated that "[ilf the fault of the
parties is reasonably within the same scale, . . . then the doctrine should bar recovery."
Id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring). Justice Marshall said, "I cannot agree that the public
interest requires that a plaintiff who has actively sought to bring about illegal restraints
on competition for his own benefit be permitted to demand redress . . . ." Id. at 151
(Marshall, J., concurring). And Justices Harlan and Stewart, concurring in part and dissenting in part, concluded that "when a person suffers losses as a result of activities the
law forbade him to engage in, I see no reason why the law should award him treble
damages from his fellow offenders." Id. at 154 (emphasis in original). Decisions subsequent to Perma Muflers in the courts of appeals have concluded that only plaintiffs who
do not bear a substantially equal responsibility for establishing an illegal scheme may
recover under authority of that decision. See, e-g., Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. MillerDavis Co., 422 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 828 (1970). See also
South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 US. 983 (1971).
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. The damage theory of such comriod of 10 to 20 years .
plaints is frequently that defendants' conduct increased prices
by "X" percent . on all sales by all manufacturers in the
entire industry, including those of nonconspirators. Therefore,
it is claimed that as the sales of the entire industry were approximately $1,000,000,000 a year, the treble damage claim per
year is $90,000,000 or $900,000,000 for 10 years, and
$1,800,000,000 for 20 years!57

. .

such circumstances, litigation is inevitably burdensome and
drawn out. Discovery is open-ended and expensive. And although the plight of defendants surely deserves attention, one
cannot turn a blind eye to the difficulties that the judicial creation of a new right of contribution may pose to the accomplishment of the primary objectives of the private treble damage action, which are to promote compensation for injured victims of
antitrust violations and to deter those violation^.^^
The potential for further complicating already exceedingly
complex litigation is raised by Rules 13 and 14 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. If a new rule of contribution is fashioned under the federal antitrust laws, then defendants seeking
contribution will routinely file Rule 13 cross-claims, thereby introducing new issues to be resolved in the action. Moreover,
Rule 14 provides,
At any time after commencement of the action a defending
party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and
complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintifh
claim against him?@

Thus, the ability of the plaintiff to select a particularly
57. Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 688.
58. These concerns were recently expressed by the Assistant Attorney General for
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in hearings on Senator Bayh's proposed contribution legislation. He observed:
Certainly, we would not want to adopt any rules that could substantially interfere with the enforcement function presently being performed by private treble
damage actions. We need to examine any effects contribution may have with
respect to complexity of antitrust litigation, antitrust deterrence, and incentives for both plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust cases to settle their disputes short of litigation. We need to fully appreciate not just the possible benefits, but also the possible costs, of contribution as a concept in antitrust
litigation and particularly of the variety of rules and procedures which could
govern contribution in antitrust litigation.
Hearings, supra note 48, at 26.
59. FED.R. CIV. P. 14(a).
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large, financially responsible and culpable defendant or defendants, and to limit its claim against them, or conversely, to seek
recovery from a party of approximately equal financial resources
to its own, would be severely circumscribed by any proposal for
contribution. The Professional Beauty Supply majority was cognizant of the danger that allowing contribution might interfere
with the plaintiffs ability to maintain control of his lawsuit. It
observed that the
fear expressed, which is indeed a legitimate one, is that a defendant may attempt to complicate the issues and confuse the
jury by impleading numerous third-party defendants or fundamentally alter the lawsuit by impleading a third-party defendant with financial resources far superior to the plaintiff or the
original defendante60

However, the majority concluded that these problems could be
resolved through the power of the court to sever for separate
trial the issues raised by any contribution cross-claims or thirdparty ~ornplaints.~~
Severing third-party contribution claims for separate trial
would, however, impose very substantial new burdens on the
federal courts arising from the basic due process requirement
that a party may not be subjected to liability as the result of a
judgment in an action to which he was not a party. Thus, if a
court should determine to sever third-party defendants for a
separate trial of the contribution claims, those defendants could
not be bound by any judgment imposing liability in the original
action. In order to obtain contribution, the defendants in the
original action would be forced to undertake a complete retrial
of the allegations of the original antitrust complaint, this time
with themselves as plaintiffs, seeking to establish before a new
jury that they were liable to the original plaintiffs, and that the
new third-party defendants were jointly liable for the same viol a t i o n ~Moreover,
.~~
this retrial of the underlying antitrust allegations would in many cases occur on stale evidence long after
the expiration of the congressionally prescribed four-year statute
of limitations for the commencement of the original antitrust ac60. 594 F.2d at 1184 (emphasis added); accord, id. at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting in
part).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF TORTS
309 (4th ed. 1971).
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tion." The prospect of such duplicative retrials of massive and
complex litigation would deter district courts from using severance to remedy the adverse effect of a new contribution right on
a private plaintiffs control of his action.
Much the same problem would be created if the defendants
in the original action choose not to implead others potentially
liable as coconspirators in order to seek contribution from them
in the underlying antitrust action, but instead wait until after
the rendition of judgment and then file an independent action in
federal district court seeking contribution on account of the
judgment already entered and paid by them."
It would be one thing to permit contribution among the defendants who are all impleaded and parties to the original antitrust action. But the ability of antitrust defendants to maintain
successive retrials of the original antitrust complaint in an attempt to spread their losses, whether as a result of a severance
or the failure of plaintiffs to join some potentially liable parties
as defendants in the original action, should be a matter for serious concern. Nevertheless, as reflected by the provisions of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, and the Restatement, Second, of
TortaP it is generally accepted in ordinary tort cases that a
party who has been held liable for damages is entitled to maintain a successive and independent action for contribution, and is
not required to implead all potential contribution defendants in
the underlying tort action. That being true, if the federal courts
were to create a right of contribution among antitrust defendants as a matter of federal common law, they would no doubt
be reluctant entirely to preclude such successive actions and to
require all contribution claims to be resolved together with the
primary claim, particularly in light of the provisions of the federal rules permitting severance and separate trials.
If a rule permitting successive independent actions for con63. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976).
64. Federal jurisdiction over such an action would be based on 28 U.S.C. $9 1331
and 1337. This was the situation in the Tenth Circuit Olson Farms case, in which Olson,
having already been held liable for a judgment of over two million dollars, sought contribution from five alleged coconspirators who it contended had sold some ninety percent of
the eggs for which it had paid damages, but who had not been named as conspirators in
the original complaint.
AMONGTORTFEASORS
ACT 8 3(a) (1955 version); UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTION
65. UNIFORM
FAULTACT 8 4(a); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS8 886A, Comment i
COMPARATIVE
(1977).
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tribution were adopted by the Congress, it would appear a clear
candidate for the "judicial impact statement" forcefully advocated by Chief Justice Burger in recent years, for it would thrust
a whole new category of complex federal litigation on the federal
courts.66In this light, it would seem somewhat incongruous for
the courts on their own initiative to fashion such a new category
of antitrust litigation as a matter of federal common law. For, as
the Supreme Court emphasized in Illinois Brick Co. u. Illinois,"
in declining to recognize a right of action on behalf of "indirect"
purchasers, "considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the
area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change
this Court's interpretati~n."~~
The Court cautioned against the
creation of new rules of liability in the antitrust field that would
"add whole new dimensions of complexity to treble-damage suits
and seriously undermine their effectivene~s."~~
Persuasive evidence of the potential for unacceptably complicating antitrust litigation lies in the fact that every district
judge who has independently considered the question, including
those sitting on the recent appellate panels, has expressed that
view. The remarks of the district court in denying motions to
assert contribution claims in the Westvaco case are typical:
Further complications to the efficient management of a suit
such as this would arise from the processing of the many possible cross-claims and impleader actions and from the fact that
joint defense efforts, with their savings in court, staff, and attorney time, would be hindered or deterred altogether. The
court has recently completed the trial of United States of
America v. International Paper, et al. and United States of
America v. Boise Cascade, et al.; those cases involved the prosecution of nine defendants with well-coordinated joint defense
efforts. The trial lasted approximately fifteen weeks. It is difficult to judicially foresee how these cases, with the class and
opt-out plaintiffs and thirty-seven defendants asserting crossclaims against each other, could be managed. Liberal use of
severance would be required for trial, and that would lead to
the consumption of courts' time in duplicative efforts. It seems
to the court that a policy of allowing contribution would complicate litigation procedurally, frustrate settlements, and in66. See Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J . 1049, 1050
(1972).
67. 431 US. 720 (1977).
68. Id. at 736.
69. Id. at 737.
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hibit joint defense efforts to such an extent that this type of
litigation would be virtually impossible to manage.'O

C. The Effect of Contribution on Settlement
One of the most difficult questions posed by any contribution rule is the effect it would have on the workability and fairness of the settlement process in antitrust litigation. These questions arise in the context of determining whether contribution
should be allowed both against an alleged antitrust violator who
has settled with the plaintiff, and in favor of such a settling defendant, and if so, in what circumstances.
1. Contribution against settling antitrust defendants
The history of judicial and legislative efforts to deal with
the thorny question of contribution against settling defendants
is a tortuous one. Under the 1939 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the plaintiffs claim against nonsettling defendants was reduced only by the amount of the settlement or the amount stipulated in the settlement, but the
settlor was not relieved from liability for contribution to nonsettling defendants unless the settlement provided for a reduction
of damages recoverable against the other tortfeasors in an
amount equal to the settler's pro rata share." That provision
was subject to substantial criticism, however.
The idea underlying the 1939 provision was that the plaintiff
should not be permitted to release one tortfeasor from his fair
share of liability and mulct another instead, from motives of
. and that the release from contribution
sympathy or spite
affords too much opportunity for collusion between the plaintiff and the released tortfeasor against the one not released.?*

..

However, reports from states in which the Act was adopted "appear to agree that it has accomplished nothing in preventing collusion" and "[tlhe effect of Section 5 of the 1939 Act has been to
discourage settlements in joint tort cases, by making it impossi70. Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. C, at 3, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract
Co., 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980).
71. UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTION
AMONG
TORTFEASORS
ACT $5 4-5 (1939 version). The
"pro rata" share was determined by dividing the total judgment by the number of
tortfeasors.
72. Id. 8 4, Commissioners' comment on subsection (b) (1955 version).
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ble for one tortfeasor alone to take a release and close the file."73
This was said to result from the fact that "no defendant wants
to settle when he remains open to contribution in an uncertain
amount, to be determined on the basis of a judgment against
another in a suit to which he will not be a party."74
Accordingly, the Act was amended in 1955 to provide that a
good faith settlement completely discharged a settling tortfeasor
from liability for contribution, even if the settlement did not
provide for a pro rata reduction of the damages that might be
collected from other defendants? The commissioners for the
1955 Act expressed the view that it was "more important not to
discourage settlements than to make an attempt of doubtful effectiveness to prevent discrimination by plaintiffs, or collusion
in the
As indicated, however, the 1955 rule was subject to question
on the ground that it might lead to collusive settlements, and
because it appeared to be inconsistent with the primary equitable objectives of the right of contribution. For this reason, a
number of common-law courts adopted the view, mainly in the
context of fashioning subsidiary rules within the framework of a
state contribution statute, that settlement should discharge a
settling tortfeasor from all liability for contribution, but that the
plaintiffs claim against the other potential defendants should be
reduced in the amount of the settlor's "pro rata share" of
damages.''
With few exceptions, courts adopting some variant of the
pro rata reduction rule in the exercise of their law-making power
have operated within the framework of a statutory contribution
scheme enacted by a state legislature; such decisions do not necessarily suggest complete judicial freedom to fashion new rights
of contribution in the absence of legislative guidance. An exception, however, is Gomes v. Brodhur~t,'~in which the court of
appeals, in a negligence case arising under the law of the Virgin
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. $ 4 (1955 version).

76. Id. Commissioners' comment on subsection (b).

STAN.L. REV.486
(1966). There is a substantial question whether under the "pro rata reduction" rule the
settlor's "pro rata" share by which plaintiffs claims against the other defendants is diminished should be measured on a "per capita," proportionate fault, or market share
basis.
78. 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1968).
77. See generally Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18
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Islands, adopted a form of the pro rata reduction rule as a corollary to its conclusion that the courts of the Virgin Islands, if
presented with the question, would permit a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors in the absence of contribution legislati~n.'~
The primary impetus for the court's dictum on the contribution issue thus arose from the perceived necessity to
insulate settling tort defendants from contribution to other defendants subsequently held liable to the plaintiff. The court reasoned that "voluntary settlements are to be encouraged and a
rule permitting contribution under such circumstances would
not work to that end" because the defendant would "have a positive incentive to stand trial and actively participate in his defense in order to minimize his liability."80 In the court's view,
only a pro rata reduction rule would ensure an "equitable distribution of liablity for joint fault and yet [encourage] out-of-court
~ettlements."~~
If a rule of contribution were adopted either by statute or as
a matter of federal common law under the antitrust laws, then it
would seem to follow either that the nonsettling defendants
should be entitled to contribution against the settlors as provided by the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act, or, in the alternative, if such contribution were precluded,
that there should be a mandatory claim reduction in some
amount calculated to remove a fair portion of liability attributable to the settlors from the case. It would be logically inconsistent to recognize a right of contribution in nonsettlement cases,
but to preserve a settling plaintiffs full right of recovery against
nonsettlors without any right of contribution against the settling
defendants. Indeed, a primary impetus for the introduction of S.
1468 providing for contribution in price-fixing cases was the
view that some form of claim reduction is desirable in the settlement context because existing law creates unfair "settlement
pressure" against nonsettling defendants, particularly in large
79. Id. at 467-68.
80. Id. at 468.
81. Id. The court declined, however, to adopt a rule automatically reducing the
plaintiffs claim on a "per capita" basis, depending on the ratio of the number of settling
tortfeasors to the total number of tortfeasors involved, in favor of a reduction based on
"the extent of [the] negligence."The court believed that the "fairness of such a system is
evident," but it was troubled by whether "its implementation will serve to encourage or
discourage settlement prior to trial" because "a plaintiff, unable to know with any certainty before verdict the extent of his recovery, will be reluctant to discharge one or
more of several tortfeasors from liability." Id. at 468-69.
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class action antitrust litigation in which potential damages can
run into the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars.s8 It
is claimed that because only the settlement amount is carved out
of ultimate recovery against nonsettling defendants under existing rules, the "exposure" of the nonsettlors increases with
each settlement, thereby increasing the pressure on nonsettlors.
Plaintiffs' counsel are said to demand a certain amount per percentage point of market share, which they escalate with each
successive settlement round without regard to the merits of their
claims against any particular settling defendant.83In the view of
the proponents of S. 1468,
the effect of this open-ended liability on a smaller defendant
who wishes to defend its innocence is to drive it into settlement, even if it believes that the risk of its being found liable is
small. .. . .
The result is to allow plaintiff's counsel to settle relatively
inexpensively with . . . some defendants (usually the large and
most responsible or those who want out as quickly as possible)
and force the remaining defendants (often those who have the
best case or are in the poorest financial position-usually the
smaller companies) to settle at a higher rate rather than run
the risk of huge liability for not only their own damages but
also for the damages of those who opted out early and cheaply.
S. 1468 will end the abuse of these "whipsaw tactics" by
relieving a defendant of the liability attributable to the defendants who es@
l.t '

To the extent that it exists, the existence of such "settlement pressure'' would appear to be primarily attributable to the
basic rule of joint and several liability of each antitrust conspirator for all damages caused by the conspiracy. Mandatory claim
reduction seems inconsistent with that principle, for it requires a
pro rata reduction of recovery rights no matter how small a part
of his damages a plaintiff obtains in settlement. Morever, the
empirical evidence on this alleged strategy is far from conclu82. See SENATE
REPORT,
supra note 41, at 2-3, 13-17, 19.
83. [A] plaintiff's settlement strategy is often implemented by announcing that
a "discount" will be given to quick settlors, based on the multiplication of an
arbitrary dollar figure per "market share" by the defendant's share of sales.
Once the initial settlements are achieved, the price of later settlements increases, because the number of remaining defendants decreases with each
settlement.
Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 689-90.
84. SENATE
REPORT,
supra note 41, at 2.
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sive. Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy in their supplemental
views on S. 1468 noted that "the availability of contribution may
well reduce the risk of damage liability for businessmen considthat "as a general
ering entering a price-fixing conspira~y,"~~
rule, contribution is denied to intentional wrongdoer^,"^^ that
"mandatory claim reduction represents a step back from the
long-established principle of joint and several liability,'"' and
that in their view,
We have been presented with absolutely no evidence that
the larger, more "culpable" defendants routinely settle pricefixing suits early in the litigation. Neither have we seen any
evidence demonstrating that small defendants are ultimately
forced to settle against their will for unreasonable amounts because of earlier settlements by larger defendant^.^^
85. Id. at 31.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 36.
88. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted). The primary example of alleged unfair settlement
pressure or "coercion" advanced by proponents of S. 1468 was that of the Green Bay
Packaging Company, named as a defendant in the Corrugated class-action litigation. According to the hearings testimony, Green Bay Packaging had a net worth of approximately $70,000,000, annual sales of $125,000,000, almost 1,800 employees, and an after
tax net income of $8.5 million in 1977. It manufactured corrugated boxes and had approximately 1.5 percent of the sales of the industry. Following a federal grand jury investigation of alleged price-fixing in the industry, a grand jury returned a number of indictments. Green Bay Packaging was not indicted.
In the hearings on S. 1468, the chairman of the board of the company claimed that
"none of our employees were named as co-conspirators by the Justice Department attorneys conducting the criminal trial." Hearings, supra note 48, at 33. He testified that
although a number of companies, including some of those indicted, settled early in the
civil proceedings for relatively low amounts per percentage point of market share, Green
Bay Packaging initially determined that there was no reason to settle because it was
innocent. It was not until over 80 percent of the defendants in the private treble damage
action had entered into settlements with the class plaintiffs that Green Bay first realized
that it was facing a potential damage exposure for the sales of the entire industry. At
that juncture, however, the plaintiffs declined to settle except on terms more onerous
than those offered to companies that had bought their peace early in the litigation.
Green Bay determined that the risk of liability was too great and threatened to impair
its credit standing, and therefore that it could not afford to litigate its innocence. Id. a t
32-39.
The facts relating to the Green Bay settlement are subject to dispute. One of plaintiffs' counsel in the Corrugated litigation advised the subcommittee that although Green
Bay Packaging itself was not indicted, it "was named as a co-conspirator in the Bill of
Particulars filed by the Justice Department in the criminal litigation" and "[e]leven of
its officers and employees . . . were also named by the government as co-conspirators."
Id. at 188-89. He also pointed out that Green Bay was among the last of the defendants
to settle, that it was not required to pay cash as had the other settling defendants, but a
promissory note payable two years later, and that Green Bay had paid significantly less
than a number of defendants that had settled earlier and less, indeed, than the average
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It seems unlikely that plaintiffs' counsel would deliberately
pursue a strategy of settling with larger, more culpable, and
more financially responsible defendants at bargain rates in order
that they might preserve their claims against innocent defendants who would be unable to discharge a jury verdict against
them in any event. The more serious concern is that the settlement strategy employed by plaintiffs' counsel has operated in
practice to permit larger and more culpable defendants to settle
early, leaving smaller and innocent ones facing liability for an
entire industry in a nationwide class action suit as a result.
Whether this has in fact been the case is an empirical matter
peculiarly subject to legislative, rather than judicial determination.
There is, morever, another perspective that raises a basic
question whether the adoption of any claim reduction rule in the
antitrust field as a corollary to a right of contribution among
antitrust defendants would be consistent with the deterrence
and compensation objectives of the private treble damage remedy. One view suggests that the modern class action has created
a form of "legalized blackmail" that unfairly disadvantages antitrust and other class-action defendants. And indeed, if it were
generally true that plaintiffs use "whipsaw" settlement tactics to
force antitrust defendants to settle for reasons unrelated to the
merits of the case, there would be reason for serious concern.
Others believe, however, that antitrust litigation, involving as it
does complex issues, extensive discovery, and defendants with
substantial financial resources, which in many cases may outweigh those of any single plaintiff, may become a "war of attrition" in which the defendants may ultimately avoid any judicial
determination of liability by taxing the plaintiffs' resources to
the point that they are willing to settle for an amount far below
their potential damage recovery. From this perspective, class-action antitrust litigation has merely served to redress the balance
of power between the plaintiffs and defendants in complex litigation. These differing viewpoints were sharply reflected in the
hearings on S. 1468, with representatives of 'the defense bar
strongly advocating the legislative creation of a right of contribution in price-fixing cases, and representatives of the plaintiffs'
settlement amount. Id. at 189-90. It also appeared that Green Bay Packaging's liability
for contribution in favor of the settling defendants, had S. 1468 been the law and had it
chosen not to settle, would have exceeded the amount it paid in settlement of plaintiffs'
claims. Id. at 190.
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bar stridently opposing it.89
The issues of settlement and contribution under the antitrust laws must be viewed in this larger context. Thus, although
current rules of liability may in some cases lead to unfair settlement pressure, the ability of antitrust plaintiffs to obtain early
settlements with some defendants may provide them with the
resources necessary to continue the lawsuit against the others.90
In addition, the settlement process provides plaintiffs with an
avenue of obtaining meaningful recovery commensurate with the
defendants' fault short of full-scale litigation. Their ability to
circumvent long, burdensome, and expensive litigation not only
significantly benefits the judicial system, but also may enhance
the deterrent effect of the private treble damage remedy. But
under a regime of mandatory claim reduction, the incentive of
plaintiffs to enter such settlements would be reduced because
they would be surrendering an undetermined but potentially significant part of their claim against the other defendants. As Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum observed in their Supplemental
Views on S. 1468:
S. 1468 substantially reduces the plaintiffs' incentive to
settle early in the litigation a t an amount which the small company with a large market share can afford. Under the law as it
now stands, the individual liabilities of the nonsettling pricefixers is reduced only by the amount of the plaintiffs' settlement with the small company unless the plaintiffs agree to a
larger deduction. S. 1468, however, forces the plaintiffs to give
up a part of their claim which may far exceed any amount that
the small company can reasonably afford. As Mr. Shapiro
pointed out [in the hearings], "No plaintiff in his right mind is
going to settle with a defendant with a small net worth and a
large market share if by so doing he is going to take 30 or 40 or
50 percent of the market out of the case." . . . And Mr.
Shenefield [Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division] observed that "even defendants who desperately want to reach a
compromise settlement may find plaintiffs reluctant to enter
into settlement agreements from fear of losing an unknown
portion of their potential recovery?"

In an earlier review of this subject, the author concluded
89. Compare Hearings, supra note 48, at 63-87, 110-22 with id. at 49-63, 91-110.
90. See SENATE
REPORT,
supra note 41, at 40 (supplemental views of Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy).
91. Id. at 38.
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that in the context of ordinary negligence litigation, the pro rata
reduction rule offered the best resolution of competing policies
because, although it might discourage partial settlements of litigation, it would not undermine the most relevant settlement
goal of encouraging entirety of settlement?' Although partial
settlements may be "an economic way of life, often yielding high
rewards" to the plaintiffs' bar:" such settlements do not prevent
actions against the others and "the adjudicative system may
thus be burdened with the case whenever the settlement is not
entire. A greater economy is apparent when the plaintiff settles
his entire cause of action by negotiating collectively with all the
tortfeasors, and entirety is therefore the more desirable settlement goal."" Nonetheless, in the antitrust field, the private
treble damage remedy serves an important deterrent as well as
compensatory function, and it is imperative that the rules
adopted not undermine the effectiveness of this remedy as a
practical matter by unduly diminishing the bargaining power of
plaintiffs versus antitrust defendants. And unless significant
pressure for partial settlement exists, entirety of settlement may
be only a hypothetical possibility.
If a contribution rule were created under the antitrust laws,
coupled with mandatory claim reduction, a number of difficult
subsidiary questions would remain, primarily concerning how
the mandatory reduction should be computed. As the impetus
for contribution rests primarily on the ground of "fairness"
among wrongdoers, it would seem to follow that some form of
comparative fault analysis should provide the general rule." But
this would interject yet another exceedingly complex factual determination, the allocation of fault among the violators, into antitrust litigation either in the initial action or in a subsequent
independent suit for contribution. Moreover, contribution on the
basis of comparative fault has been criticized on the ground that
it would deter both plaintiffs and defendants from settling-plaintiffs because, despite the settlement, they would be
forced to litigate the fault of the settling defendants in their action against the nonsettlors; and defendants because they would
92.
(1967).
93.
94.
95.

See Note, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN.L. REV.486, 488-89, 493
Id. at 489.

Id.

See UNIFORM
COMPARATIVE
FAULTACT 5 4. See also United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
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be unable to avoid the judicial determination of their liability, in
an action to which they were not parties, that might encourage
other potential lawsuits.*
In the Professional Beauty Supply case, the majority of the
court adopted "a rule of pro rata contribution except in unusual
~ircumstances"@~
because of "the administrative difficulties of
assessing exact percentages of fault in complicated antitrust actions" and because the court believed that "a rule of pro rata
contribution will serve as a more effective deterrent to antitrust
~iolations."~~
But this analysis would seem itself to disregard
what the Professional Beauty Supply majority declared to be
the "deciding factor" in its decision, namely "fairness between
the parties."@@
If the "pro rata share" be determined, as the Professional Beauty Supply majority apparently assumed, on a
"per capita" basis, then obviously the contribution share would
bear no necessary or even close relationship either to the fault or
to the economic benefits realized by the contribution defendant.
This difficulty could be ameliorated to some degree by determining the "pro rata share" on the basis of the market share of the
settling defendant or by the "actual damages attributable to the
settling person's sales or purchases of goods or services" as proposed in s. 1468, but again, these measures, although perhap8
proportionate to the "benefits" supposedly realized by the conspirator, bear no necessary relationship to its fault and degree of
involvement in the conspiracy, which would seem to be necessary considerations in any rule grounded primaily on considerations of fairness.
2. Contribution on behalf of settling antitrust defendants

An issue generally ignored in the commentary is whether
contribution should be available in favor of an antitrust violator
that has voluntarily settled the action against it without any judicial determination of its liablity. This is the situation in a
companion to the Tenth Circuit Olson Farms case, in which the
original antitrust plaintiffs had commenced a "follow-on" action
against Olson, seeking damages for the alleged continuation of
96. See Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93
1555 (1980).
97. 594 F.2d at 1182 n.4.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1185.

HARV.
L. REV.1540,
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the conspiracy for which they had previously recovered judgment. Olson filed cross-claims against the other defendants in
the follow-on action, and a third-party complaint against an alleged coconspirator not named as a defendant by the plaintiffs.
The district court dismissed Olson's cross-claims and a thirdparty complaint.loOFollowing the entry of judgment, however,
Olson Farms settled the action of the antitrust plaintiffs against
it with the result that it avoided any judicial determination of
its liability. Olson nonetheless maintained on appeal that it was
entitled to contribution on account of the settlement amount
that it had negotiated with the plaintiffs, both against other alleged coconspirators who themselves had settled with the antitrust plaintiffs, and against the third-party defendant, who had
not.lol
Although a minority of state statutes do not permit contribution unless a joint judgment has been entered against the alleged tortfeasors,lo2 the prevailing view expressed by the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is that contribution is
available on account of a settlement payment.lo3 There is substantial reason to question whether this rule, which arose in negligence actions, should be uncritically extended to the antitrust
area even if a right of contribution otherwise existed. As illustrated by the second Okon case, such a rule would mean that
even though the only plaintiff possessing a cause of action under
section 4 of the Clayton Act had entirely settled an antitrust action against the defendants, thereby removing the burden of the
action from the federal courts, an antitrust conspirator who voluntarily entered such a settlement would nevertheless be permitted to assume the garb of a plaintiff and maintain a contribution action based on the same allegations. Moreover, because
no judicial determination of liability was ever made in the underlying antitrust action against the settling defendant, it would
be necessary, despite the settlement, for the settling defendant
as contribution plaints to litigate the entire antitrust case,
proving with competent evidence both that it was liable in fact
100. Cackling Acres v. Olson Ftlrms, Inc., No. C-75-472 (D. Utah Dec. 19, 1977) (order dismissing cross-claims and third-party complaint).
101. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Countryside Farms, Inc., No. 78-1773 (10th Cir. Nov. 8,
1979).
102. See generally Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F.
supra note 62, at 308-09.
Supp. 1339, 1343 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); W. PROSSER,
CONTRIBUTION
AMONGTORTFEASORS
ACT $ 1(a) (1955 version).
103. UNIFORM
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to the antitrust plaintiff and that the alleged contribution defenThe contribution plaintiff would
dants were its co~onspirators.~~~
also be required to prove that the amount of its settlement was
reasonable in light of its potential damage exposure and the risk
of an adverse jury verdict,lo5 an exceedingly difficult process
under any circumstance^.^^^

D. "Fairness" Among Antitrust Violators: The Relevance of
Intent
A primary impetus for creating a right of contribution
under the antitrust laws has arisen from allegations that existing
rules of joint and several liability create "unfair settlement pressure." As previously discussed, resolution of this argument turns
primarily on empirical determinations and legislative policy
judgments. In addition, however, advocates of contribution have
contended that even in a litigated case, considerations of fairness favor creation of a right of contribution and outweigh
whatever harm might arise from the standpoint of decreasing
deterrence, discouraging settlement, or increasing the complexity of antitrust litigation. The Professional Beauty Supply majority stated that "the deciding factor in our decision is fairness
between the parties" and that "[tlhere is an obvious lack of
sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire buden of
restitution of a loss for which two parties are responsible to be
placed upon one alone because of the plaintiffs whim or spite,
104. "[A] compromiser must sustain the burden of proof. . . as to his own liability
to the original plaintiff' and "the contribution defendant must be a tortfeasor, and origiSUPM note 62, at 309. See, e.g., W. D. Rubright
nally liable to the plaintiff." W. PROSSER,
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (Pennsylvania statute).
105. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 62, at 309.
106. The district court in the contribution action would also be forced to determine
whether the release of the contribution plaintiff had the effect of releasing all of the
alleged contribution defendants from liability to the plaintiffs. If the settlement did not
have that effect, it is generally accepted that the contribution plaintiff conferred no
"benefit" on the alleged contribution defendants sufficient to entitle it to force them to
share the amount of its settlement. See, e.g., Allbright Bros., Contractors v. Hull-Dobbs
Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953) (Arkansas statute); Brenham v. Southern Pacific Co.,
328 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1971) (Louisiana statute), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061 (1972); UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTION
AMONG
TORTFEASORS
& F. JAMES,THELAWOF TORTS719 (1956).
ACT, $ l(d) (1955 version); 1 F. HARPER
Whether the release had that effect is a matter of federal law which requires a detailed
inquiry into the intent of the parties. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401
U.S. 321, 342-47 (1971).
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or his collusion with the other wrongdoer."lo7
This language should be contrasted with that of Professor
Prosser, its unacknowledged source, who more accurately states
the shared community perception of equity among wrongdoers.
What Prosser actually said was:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which
permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants
were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered
onto one alone, according to the accident of . . the plaintiffs
whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer

.

....

108

Beginning with the Restatement of Restitution in 1937, and
carrying on through the 1939 and 1955 versions of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act, and the Restatement, Second, of Torts, it
has been generally accepted, even in jurisdictions permitting
contribution by statute, that considerations of fairness do not
require permitting an intentional wrongdoer to relieve himself of
a portion of the damages for which he is otherwise jointly and
severally responsible. For example, section l(c) of the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides: "There is
no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally
caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful
death."loBThe Restatement, Second, of Torts provides: "There
is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has
intentionally caused the harm."llo The comments to the Restatement note that "contribution is a remedy that developed in
equity"lll and that

...

[IJn the absence of statute, the courts have adhered to the
original English rule that no right of contribution arises in
favor of one who has intentionally caused harm to another.
The basis of the rule is the old one that the courts will not aid
one who has deliberately done harm, so that no man can be
permitted to found a cause of action on his own intentional
tort.llg
107. 594 F.2d at 1185-86.
supra note 62, at 307 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
108. W. FROSSER,
109. UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTION
AMONG
TORTFEASORS
ACT 8 1(c) (1955 version).
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
8 886A(3) (1977).
110. RESTATEMENT
111. Id. Comment c.
112. Id. Comment j (emphasis added). The Restatement notes that the rule "has
been modified
to permit contribution in favor of one who is charged with a purely

.. .
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The Restatement applies the same rule to reckless conduct,
which "usually approaches the degree of moral blame attached
to intentional harm, since the defendant deliberately inflicts a
highly unreasonable risk of harm upon others in conscious disregard of it."llS In the brief amicus curiae for the United States
urging the grant of certiorari in the Westvaco case, the Solicitor
General recognized that the considerations of equity and fairness that have prompted state legislatures to enact statutes providing for apportionment of damages in negligence cases cannot
be transported to require such apportionment among antitrust
conspirators.l14
In the face of these strong expressions that contribution is
inappropriate in the case of intentional wrongdoers, advocates of
contribution have urged that most antitrust violations do not involve intent to cause harm of a nature that would preclude the
assistance of a court of equity,"' to the extent of contending
that "[elven in cases of so-called per se liability, intent to cause
harm is not necessary for the violation" and that "[a] principle
excluding contribution, based on intent to cause harm, would
. . allow contribution in most antitrust cases."lle
This analysis is subject to serious question. Conspiracies
and attempts to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act require a finding of a specific intent to monopolize as a
precondition of liability.l17 This was the situation in the Tenth
Circuit Okon Farms case, for example, in which Olson, which
sought contribution, had been subjected to liability in the un-

.

technical tort" such as "one who has become liable for conversion by reason of his bona
fide purchase of stolen goods . . . ." Id. This qualification would not appear to be relevant to the question of contribution in favor of an antitrust conspirator.
113. Id. Comment k. Similarly, the Commissioners' Comment to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (apparently not yet adopted by any state) points out that "[tlhe Act
LAWSANNOTATED,
Comment to 8 1 (1980
does not include intentional torts." 12 UNIFORM
Supp.). Some proponents of contribution have apparently overlooked this limitation. See
Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 738, 750 & n.185.
114. "While we recognize that contribution arguably may enhance fairness in some
circumstances, we do not regard as in itself unfair the principle of joint and several liability for the consequences of concerted intentional misconductwhich is the general
rule for both criminal and tort liability in our legal system." Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 15, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980).
115. E.g., Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 751.
116. Id. a t 752-53.
117. Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., Buick Motor Div., 517 F.2d 567,576 (10th
Cir. 1975) ("specific intent to monopolize is the heart of a conspiracy charge"); REPORT
OF SECTION
ANTITRUST
LAW,supra note 35, at 59-63 (1979); E. KINTNER,
AN ANTITRUST
PRIMER108-09 (2d ed. 1973).
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derlying antitrust action on the basis of evidence of blatant anticompetitive conduct.l18 Moreover, beyond antitrust violations
requiring a finding of specific intent, a wide range of the most
prevalent private treble damage actions allege per se violations
of the antitrust laws such as price fixing. To argue that "[tlhe
parties to such conduct . . . may not intend to cause harm"119
disregards the nature of the per se antitrust violation. There is
no analogy between such conduct, which under accepted norms
of commercial behavior does carry with it substantial moral turpitude, and technical violations of a statute such as "driving at a
speed in excess of the statutory limit or parking next to a fire
plug"120 in which contribution may be appropriate.
In United States u. United States Gypsum Co.,lal the
United States Supreme Court considered the state of mind required to sustain a criminal violation of the antitrust laws. Gypsum did not involve a per se violation of the antitrust laws such
as an agreement to fix prices, but an agreement within the "rule
of reason" to exchange price information, allegedly for the purpose of assuring compliance with the "meeting competition" defense of section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Supreme
Court held that proof of a criminal violation of the antitrust
118. As the court of appeals stated in affirming the judgment against Olson on account of which contribution was sought:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs did not rely on price parallelism alone to
prove that Olson Farms and its alleged conspirators forced downward the price
paid to Utah-Idaho egg producers. There was other evidence, which the jury
apparently chose to believe, that representatives of Olson Farms and its coconspirators had numerous meetings a t Harman's Cafe, and that in addition
thereto, there were constant telephone calls between the various conspirators,
all in furtherance of the conspiracy to peg egg prices in the Utah-Idaho area.
Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242, 245 (10th Cir. 1976).
The trial court had instructed the jury that it could find Olson Farms liable as a
conspirator only if it determined that Olson had intentionally entered into a conspiracy
to fix prices: "[A]cceptance of [an agreement to restrain trade] must be conscious and
intentional"; and "it must be shown that. . . the members [of the conspiracy] came to a
mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan." Record at 7366-67.
The trial court further instructed on plaintiffs' conspiracy to monopolize claim that the
Cackling Acres plaintiffs were required to prove that Olson conspired "with the specific
intent . . . to acquire or exercise monopoly power." Id. a t 7379 (emphasis added). See
also id. a t 7383, 7387-88. Judge Holloway, although dissenting from the Tenth Circuit's
denial of contribution in the Olson Farms case, acknowledged: "I agree that a t this juncture Olson Farms must be considered an intentional wrongdoer" and that "we must regard Olson Farms as an intentional wrongdoer since conspiracy and attempt [to monopolize] both require a finding of specific intent." 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 79,706 n.3.
119. Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, a t 752.
120. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS5 886A, Comment j (1977).
121. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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laws requires evidence that the illegal agreement was taken either with the specific intent of producing anticompetitive effects, or with knowledge that such effects were substantially certain to occur, for "[iln either circumstance, the defendants are
consciously behaving in a way the law prohibits, and such conThe Court
duct is a fitting object of criminal p~nishment."'~~
appeared to draw a distinction between criminal violations,
which require such proof of "mens rea," and civil violations,
which do not.lag
Gypsum suggests that some rule of reason violations may
indeed expose conspirators to civil liability even though they
thought they were doing nothing wrong and had no intent to
cause harm. Such an analysis has no applicability to a conspiracy to fix prices or to commit some other per se violation of the
antitrust laws. As pointed out in a leading post-Gypsum decision, "the mere existence of a price-fixing agreement establishes
a defendant's illegal purpose."124 Thus, in order to sustain a
criminal conviction for price fixing, no proof of intent, beyond
the intent to fix prices, is required."'
The Supreme Court's concern [in Gypsum] with those who
unwittingly violate the antitrust laws has no place here. Here,
defendants have fixed prices, "probably the clearest violation
of the antitrust laws and the one most obnoxious to the underlying policy of free competition." The act of agreeing to fix
prices is in itself illegal, the criminal act is the agreement.lS6

The possibility remains that the interests of fairness would
require the fashioning of a contribution rule that would permit
contribution to "unintentional" antitrust violators while denying
it to those who commit per se violations of the antitrust laws or
act with the specific intent to restrain trade. In the OZson Farms
case, the Tenth Circuit suggested the possibility of an exception
in the case of an "unintentional violator."la7 In the Abraham
Construction case, however, the Fifth Circuit majority declined
to endorse such a distinction on the grounds that it would open
122. Id. at 445.
123. Id. at 443 n.19.
124. United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 1979).
125. Id. (footnote omitted). Accord, United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603
F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d
1101 (7th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979).
126. 599 F.2d at 545.
127. 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 79,704.
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a "Pandora's box'' of procedural complexities and could impair
the deterrent function of the private treble damage remedy.128
Even assuming that inequity may occur in a particular case
. . we believe that creating a contribution right for an unintentional violator may inimically affect the implementation of
.the antitrust laws. The possible detriments that can be envisioned make this an inappropriate case for the exercise of our
power to shape the federal common law.12e

.

Although the argument for contribution based on fairness in
the case of a truly unintentional violator-if such a case were to
arise-is not without substance, it is of interest to note, in assessing the prevalence of this situation, that all four of the leading decisions on this question in the courts of appeals (Professional Beauty Supply, Abraham Construction, Westvaco, and
Olson Farms) involved allegations of a conspiracy to fix prices,
or violations requiring a finding of specific intent, or both. It is
also clear that making the availability of contribution contingent
on the absence of intent would add substantial additional complications to already exceedingly complex private treble damage
actions by creating a major issue regarding the state of mind and
degree of culpability of the various defendants.lS0Morever, such
a rule would necessarily create considerable uncertainty about
when contribution might be available, thus undermining the certainty necessary to make rational settlement decisions.1s1

129. Id. at 905.
130. See Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV.
L. REV.1540,
1555-56 (1980).
131. The Professional Beauty Supply majority was also influenced by allegations in
National's third-party complaint that La Maur had solicited National to become its distributor and that National had no responsibility for La Maur's decision to terminate the
plaintiff. 594 F.2d at 1181. The court of appeals noted the possibility that a "large or
powerful tortfeasor" with "sufficient economic influence to prevent a plaintiff from including it as a defendant" could escape liability entirely. Id. at 1185. Similarly, Judge
Holloway dissenting in the Tenth Circuit's decision in Olson Farms, although acknowledging that the "record . . . does not deal with the motives and circumstances of the
bringing of this antitrust suit" pointed out the possibility of "a plaintiff deliberately
choosing to sue a less formidable, but financially responsible defendant, and avoiding
litigation with other equally culpable parties." 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 79,706. There is
little if any empirical evidence to support such conjecture, and such a strategy would
appear in the ordinary case to be counter to the incentive of a private plaintiff to include
those defendants most culpable and most financially responsible in its action.
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A. Contribution in Negligence and Securities Act Cases
The Professional Beauty Supply majority and other advocates of contribution have emphasized a perceived "trend" toward the allowance of contribution among joint wrongdoers in
support of their suggestion that a new right of contribution
should be fashioned under the antitrust laws.lS2Although such a
"trend" undoubtedly exists, closer analysis of the circumstances
in which it has manifested itself is required if it is to be placed
in perspective and its limitations understood.
Proponents of contribution have relied on a small minority
of decisions that have judicially implied a right of contribution
among joint tortfeasors in negligence cases.1ss With one exception,lS4those decisions arose under state law, and thus did not
purport to call into question the long-standing rule of the Union
Stock Yards case denying a right of contribution as a matter of
federal common law. More fundamentally, the cases cited were
all negligence cases. This limitation is explicit in the case going
furthest to fashion a new judicial rule of contribution as a matter of federal common law, Kohr u. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.lS6
Kohr involved consolidated wrongful death and property damage suits arising out of a mid-air collision that were commenced
under diversity and Federal Tort Claims Act jurisdiction. Defendants United States and Allegheny settled and then sought contribution and indemnity from the other defendants. The district
court ruled that, under the applicable law of Indiana, no such
right of contribution existed. The court of appeals reversed on
the ground that the district court had erred in applying Indiana
law to the cross-claims and third-party complaints for indemnity
and contribution, and instead held that "there should be a federal law of contribution and indemnity governing mid-air collisions such as the one here" because of the "predominant, indeed
132. 594 F.2d at 1184. See also Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 749; RESECTION
OF ANTITRUST
LAW,supra note 35, at 4-5; SENATE
REPORT,
supra note
41, at 4-9.
133. See e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Gomes v. Broadhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967); Knell v.
Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
134. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 401 (7th Cir. 1974).
135. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974).
PORT OF

.
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almost exclusive, interest of the federal government in regulating the affairs of the nation's airways."lM The court's holding
was expressly limited to the fashioning of a rule permitting contribution and indemnity among unintentional wrongdoers:
We reject as being outmoded and entirely unsatisfactory, the
contention that the federal rule should be one of "no contribution." We agree that "[tlhere is an obvious lack of sense and
justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss, for
which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered on to one alone . . . .,9187

Considerations of fairness and equity are far clearer in the
negligence area than in the case of antitrust violations. Morever,
the development of rights and remedies in negligence actions
has long been the peculiar province of common-law courts, save
only as their creativeness may be restrained by legislative enactment. In contrast, the prescription of rights and remedies under
the antitrust laws has fundamentally been the province of Congress, and the judiciary must therefore exercise its law-making
powers with some care to avoid undercutting the primary legislative policies expressed by the statutory remedial scheme of the
antitrust laws.lS8
Proponents of contribution have also relied upon decisions
permitting contribution among joint violators of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even where
the violations were intentional.lS9They argue that such decisions
"granted contribution rights even under sections of the Securities Act which did not contain explicit provisions for such
rights."140 The Professional Beauty Supply majority cited a
136. Id. at 403. In view of the settled principle that state substantive law applies
both in diversity actions and in actions arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act, one
might question the court's holding as a matter of substantive law.
137. Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
138. Some commentators have also noted that in England the common-law rule, unlike the rule of the Union Stock Yards case in the United States, denied contribution
only to willful or conscious wrongdoers, and that by virtue of the Law Reform (Married
Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935 even that limitation is no longer applied, and contribution is permitted among joint tortfeasors "where damage is suffered by any person
as a result of a tort (whether a crime or not)." Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at
736-37 (quoting 25-26 Geo. 5, c. 30 (1935); SALMOND
ON TORTS445 (17th ed. 1977)).
There has been no corresponding statutory expansion of rights of contribution in the
United States.
REPORT,supra note 41, at 7-9; REPORTOF SECTION
OF
139. See generally, SENATE
m u m LAW,supra note 35, at 4-5; Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 742-43.
140. Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9, at 742 (footnote omitted).
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number of the securities act cases in support of its conclusion
that "federal courts have been willing to formulate rules for contribution in other areas of the law without express congressional
direction."141
This analysis overlooks the fact that several sections of the
securities acts in which Congress created an express private
right of action for damages also include a provision for contribution among defendants without regard to their culpability. For
example, section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: "All
or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) of
this section shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this section
Substantially identical lanmay recover contribution . . .
guage appears in the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 dealing with the manipulation of security prices14' and
misleading statements.lu There are no comparable provisions
expressly authorizing contribution among defendants held
jointly liable for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933, but the reason for this is obvious: Congress provided no
express private right of action for damages under such provisions. Not having done so, it could hardly be expected to have
authorized contribution with respect to a remedy that it did not
create. The courts would appear to have been on solid ground as
a matter of congressional intent and legal process in determining
that in such cases where securities act damage liability to private parties was judicially implied, a right of contribution should
be permitted by analogy to those express private rights of action
that the Congress did create.""

B. Contribution in Admiralty Cases
The need for caution against uncritical extension "by analogy" of decisions in other areas of the law, which are concerned
with other questions, and involve different policy considerations,
is also illustrated by the admiralty cases cited by proponents of
the judicial creation of a right of contribution under the anti141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

594 F.2d at 1184 (footnote omitted).
15 U.S.C. 5 77k(f) (1976).
Id. 5 78i(e).
Id. 5 78r(b).
See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968).
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trust laws. Notwithstanding the settled rule of the Union Stock
Yards case, which denies any right of contribution as a matter of
federal common law, federal courts sitting in admiralty have
from the beginning followed a rule permitting contribution in
maritime cases. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling &
Refitting Corp.,14@
the United States Supreme Court pointed out
that
Where two vessels collide due to the fault of both, it is
established admiralty doctrine that the mutual wrongdoers
shall share equally the damages sustained by each, as well as
personal injury and property damage inflicted on innocent
third parties. This maritime rule is of ancient origin and has
been 'applied in many cases . . . .147

The Court made clear that this "admiralty doctrine of ancient lineage"148was distinct from the general federal commonlaw rule denying contribution among wrongdoers: "In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction
have generally held that they cannot on their own initiative create an enforceable right of contribution as between joint
tortfeasors." [citing the Union Stock Yards case].149Noting that
the common-law rule had provoked both criticism and defense,
the Court observed in Halcyon that "to some extent courts exercising jurisdiction in maritime affairs have felt freer than common-law courts in fashioning rules, and we would feel free to do
so here if wholly convinced that it would best serve the ends of
justice."lM In the circumstances of Halcyon, however, the court
declined to permit a right of contribution.
Halcyon Lines had hired Haenn Ship Corporation to repair
Halcyon's ship. Haenn's employee was injured on the ship while
making the repairs, and the employee sued Halcyon, claiming
that his injuries were caused by its negligence and the unseaworthiness of its vessel. Halcyon sought contribution from Haenn.
The jury concluded that Haenn was 75 percent responsible and
Halcyon 25 percent responsible. Under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Haenn was liable without
fault to its employee for his injuries. The Act further provided
146. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
147. Id. at 284 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
148. Cooper Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 110 (1974).
149. 342 U.S. at 285 (citing Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196
U.S. 217, 224 (1905)).
150. Id. (footnote omitted).
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that "the liability of an employer prescribed . . . shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the
employee . . . at law or in admiralty on account of such injury
or death . . . ."Iu Haenn had argued that the Harbor Workers'
Act provided its exclusive liability, "thereby preventing a third
party from having any right of contribution against an employer
under the Act in cases where the joint negligence of a third
party and the employer injure an employee covered by the
Act."lS2 The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide this
question because it concluded on independent grounds that "it
would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules of contribution and that the solution of this problem should await congressional action."lSa
The bases for the Supreme Court's conclusion were (1)that
Congress had pre-empted the question of rights and remedies in
the area of maritime personal injuries in non-collision cases by
enacting a complex system of statutes in the area, and (2) that
the questions presented were not within the judicial competence.
The Court stated:

.

Congress has already enacted much legislation in the area of
maritime personal injuries. For example, under the Harbor
Workers' Act Congress has made fault unimportant . . .; Congress has made further inroads on traditional court law by abolition of the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk . . . . The Harbor Workers' Act in turn must be
integrated with other acts such as the Jones Act . . . . Many
groups of persons with varying interests are vitally concerned
with the proper functioning and administration of all these
Acts as an integrated whole. We think that legislative consideration and action can best bring about a fair accomodation of
the diverse but related interests of these groups. The legislative
process is peculiarly adapted to determine which of the many
possible solutions to this problem would be most beneficial in
the long run.lM

Advocates of the creation of a right of contribution under
the antitrust laws have contended that Halcyon was "in effect
confined . . . to cases where the extension of the admiralty rule
would conflict with a clearly expressed statutory rule making an151. Id. at 286 n.12.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 285.
154. Id. at 285-86 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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other remedy excl~sive""~by the later decision of the Supreme
Court in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, I ~ C .In' ~that
~
action, a vessel owned by Kopke was loaded by petitioner
Cooper Stevedoring Company in Mobile, Alabama, and then
proceeded to Houston where another stevedore was employed to
load additional cargo. A Houston longshoreman engaged in this
task fell between a gap in the crates that had been loaded in
Mobile and injured himself. He sued the vessel in admiralty and
the vessel in turn sought recovery over from Cooper alleging that
any negligence or unseaworthiness was the result of its activities.
The district court concluded that the loading of the original
cargo had created an unseaworthy condition and that Cooper
had been negligent. Accordingly, the court divided damages
equally between the vessel and Cooper. The United States Supreme Court rejected Cooper's contention based on Halcyon
that there could be no award of contribution against it. It observed that "despite the occasional breadth of its dictum"157the
Halcyon opinion should be read against the historical backdrop
of the "admiralty doctrine of ancient lineage" which "provides
that the mutual wrongdoers shall share equally in damages sustained by each."'58 The Cooper Court noted that "since the employee [in Halcyon] was covered by the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act . . he was prohibited from
suing his employer Haenn."lm It was the Cooper Court's view
that the Halcyon Court

.

took cognizance of the apparent trade-off in the Act between
the employer's limitation of liability and the abrogation in
favor of the employee of common-law doctrines of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. . . . Confronted with the
possibility that any workable rule of contribution might be inconsistent with the balance struck by Congress in the Harbor
Workers' Act between the interests of carriers, employers, employees, and their respective insurers, we refrained from allowing contribution in the circumstances of that case.160

In contrast, the employee in Cooper was not an employee either
of the vessel or of Cooper, and "on the facts of this case, then,
155. Littman & Van Buskirk, supra note 9,at 740.
156. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
157. Id. at 111.
158. Id. at 110.
159. Id. at 111.
160. Id. at 112.
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. . . no countervailing considerations detract from the well-established maritime rule allowing contribution between joint
tortfeasors."lsl

It is going too far to say that after Cooper, Halcyon means
only that federal courts should refrain on their own initiative
from creating common-law rights of contribution in cases in
which Congress has expressly legislated a statutory immunity.
Cooper rested fundamentally on the historic maritime doctrine
permitting contribution, and held that in an admiralty case resting on allegations of unseaworthiness and negligence, it saw no
reason to depart from that "well-established maritime rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors" absent some indication of inconsistency with the policies underlying legislation in
the area.ls2
In the context of the antitrust laws, however, the question is
not whether a court should depart from a well-established rule
permitting contribution, but whether it should adhere to the
long-standing federal common-law rule denying contribution in
the absence of legislation on the question, and moreover,
whether it should do so in a context where arguments based on
the principle of fairness are far from compelling and turn in significant part on empirical and legislative facts. In addition, there
is substantial reason to question whether the existence of such a
right would be consistent with the deterrence and compensation
objectives underlying the private treble damage remedy. In that
context, the Halcyon Court's concerns about upsetting the balance among competing interests established by Congress and its
conclusion "that the legislative process is peculiarly adapted to
determine which of the many possible solutions to this problem
would be most beneficial in the long run" has continuing
relevance. lsS
161. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), the Supreme
Court abrogated the traditional admiralty rule of equal division of damages in maritime
collision cases, initially announced over 120 years before. The respondent had urged that
"creation of a new rule of damages in maritime collision cases is a task for Congress and
not for this Court." Id. at 409 (footnote omitted). The Court responded, "the Judiciary
has traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law mcrritime, and Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the
controlling rules of admiralty law.' "Id. (emphasis added). Reliable Transfer was thus a
case in which the Court exercised its recognized primacy as lawgiver in a field in which
the development of remedial law had traditionally been the province of the courts, to
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C. The Relevance of Cases Dealing with the Implication of
Private Rights of Action for Damages
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California,lWthe Supreme
Court considered whether section 4 of the Clayton Act authorized a state to sue for damages for injuries to its "general economy" allegedly attributable to violations of the antitrust laws. It
concluded that such authorization did not exist. After reviewing
the history of actions by states as parens patriae on behalf of
their citizens,166the Court pointed out that "[t]he question in
this case is not whether Hawaii may maintain its lawsuit on behalf of its citizens, but rather whether the injury for which it
seeks to recover is compensable under # 4 of the Clayton Act."166
It held that it was not because the injury claimed was not to the
"business or property" of the state within the meaning of section
4 and thus did not fall within the language of the congressional
remedial grant, which provides:
At the very least, if the latter type of injury [to the state's
economy] is to be compensable under the antitrust laws, we
should insist upon a clear expression of a congressional purpose to make it so, and no such expression is to be found in 8 4
of the Clayton Act?"

To recognize a right of antitrust contribution would be to go well
beyond the express rights of action for damages that Congress
has provided in section 4 of the Clayton Act and to fashion a
new private right of action in favor, not of a person injured in
his business and property, but of a conspirator whose conduct
has caused such injury.
Although the United States Supreme Court has, where a
abrogate a rule that it itself had announced in an earlier decision, in circumstances
where the rule had met with almost uniform condemnation and the United States was
the only major maritime nation in which it continued to be followed. Far different considerations apply under the statutory scheme of the antitrust laws. Cf. Edmonds v.
Campagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979), which declined to extend the
Reliable Transfer principle of division of damages based on comparative fault to an action by an injured longshoreman against a shipowner, on the ground that "here we deal
with an interface of statutory and judge-made law." 443 U.S. at 272. Although the Edmonds court was concerned primarily with possible impairment of congressional reliance
on an existing rule, its analysis equally counsels caution in creating new common law
rights that could impair the policies underlying remedies that Congress has provided.
164. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
165. Id. a t 257-59.
166. Id. at 259.
167. Id. a t 264.
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right of action is based on an alleged constitutional violation,
freely implied a private damage remedy,168it has been much
more restrictive where the construction of a statute is involved.
In Davis v. P a s ~ m a n , the
l ~ ~Court pointed out that "the question of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of who may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution." Furthermore, the Court stated that
"statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress,
and it is entirely appropriate for Congress, in creating these
rights and obligations, to determine in addition who may enforce
them and in what manner."170 In Cort v. Ash,171 the Supreme
Court, in the course of an opinion holding that there was no private damage remedy against corporate directors under a criminal statute prohibiting certain political contributions, articulated the now familiar four-part standard for the implication of
a private right of action:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted" . . . . Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States . . . .178

Even if all of the very serious doubts concerning whether
allowing a right of contribution would be "consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme" could be resolved,
an attempt to imply such a right under the Cort standards
would normally flounder because the proposed contribution
plaintiff would not be "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."17" To the extent that the impetus to
168. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 100 S.Ct 1468 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (damage action based on sex discrimination in violation of
the fifth amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth amendment).
169. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
170. Id. a t 241 (emphasis in original).
171. 422 US. 66 (1975).
172. Id. a t 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
173. One may question whether the flexible Cort analysis does not state a considerably more liberal view on the propriety of implying a private damage remedy than is
presently held by a majority of the Court. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560 (1979), for example, the Court held that customers of brokerage firms required to file
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recognize a right of contribution under the antitrust laws rests
on a perceived need for additional "deterrence" to further the
"private attorney general" objective of the treble damage remedy, these decisions would appear to be controlling. On the other
hand, much of the impetus for the implication of a right of contribution under the antitrust laws rests on a perception of the
need to assure "fairness between the parties." In this context,
the Cort analysis is not fully applicable, for the question is not
one of judicially implying a remedy as an adjunct of a primary
duty already statutorily prescribed, but of whether the judiciary
should, in the first instance, imply an underlying primary duty
among wrongdoers themselves.
In Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union,17' the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit implicitly
recognized the limited utility of the Cort analysis in the contribution context, holding that the "first prong" of the Cort test
(whether the plaintiff was "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted") was inapposite.175The plaintiff, representing a class of Northwest's female cabin attendants,
recovered damages against the airline employer for violations of
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and title VII of the Civil Rights Act
certain financial reports with regulatory agencies had no implied private right of action
for damages based upon misstatements in such reports. Justice Rehnquist for the Court
noted that "once again, we are called upon to decide whether a private remedy is implicit
in a statute not expressly providing one. During this Term alone, we have been asked to
undertake this task no fewer than five times in cases in which we have granted certiorari." Id. at 562 (footnote omitted). The message of caution to the courts of appeals is
unmistakable. Reversing the court of appeals which had implied such a right of action
upon the basis of Cort v. Ash, Justice Rehnquist admonished, inter a h , that "implying
a private right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, a t
best" and that
where, as here, the plain language of the [statute] weighs against implication of
a private remedy, the fact that there is no suggestion whatsoever in the legislative history that 17(a) may give rise to suits for damages reinforces our decision not to find such a right of action implicit within the section.
Id. a t 571-72. Moreover, he noted that the statutory provision question was "flanked by
provisions of the 1934 Act that explicitly grant private causes of action . . . Obviously,
then, when Congress wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so
and did so expressly." Id. In conclusion, "the central inquiry remains whether Congress
intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action." Id. a t
575.
174. 606 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct 3008 (June 16, 1980).
The Supreme Court directed that Northwest Airlines be set for argument in tandem
with the Westvaco case. As previously noted, the writ of certiorari in Westvaco has now
been dismissed.
175. Id. at 1354.

.
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of 1964.1T6After the entry of judgment, Northwest commenced a
separate action against the bargaining representatives of its employees alleging that the discrimination in question had resulted
from the collective bargaining agreement between Northwest
and the unions.lT7The district court held that there was no right
of contribution under the Equal Pay Act, but that the federal
common law provided a basis for a claim of contribution under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1T8
The court of appeals afhmed as to the Equal Pay Act. The
court reasoned that the existence of a right of contribution
should turn on whether the plaintiff in the underlying action
could have held either of the two defendants liable, in which
case a right of contribution would normally be recognized, but
that "if, on the other hand, one of the defendants is protected
from suit by the plaintiff, it will also [generally] be protected
from c o n t r i b u t i ~ n . "Because
~~~
Congress had explicitly provided
for a private right of action for damages against the employer
but not the union under the Equal Pay Act, the court of appeals
concluded that "this statutory protection would certainly be
frustrated by a declaration that an employer could recover from
a union, once that employer had been found liable to its
employees."180
Thus, the deciding factor for the court of appeals in Northwest was the "third prong of the Cort test-consistency with the
legislative scheme."181 As previously suggested in this article, the
consistency of a contribution right with the compensation and
deterrence objectives of the private treble damage remedy under
the antitrust laws is open to very serious doubt.

D. The Interstitial Lawmaking Role of the Judiciary under
the Antitrust Laws
In the Professional Beauty Supply case, the Eighth Circuit
observed that:
the antitrust statutes are not purported to be comprehensive
176. Id. at 1352.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1352-53.
179. Id. at 1354.
180. Id. at 1355. The court of appeals declined to reach the question of contribution
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but remanded for consideration of the
union's defense based on laches. Id. at 1356.
181. Id. at 1355.
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and, possibly as a result, courts have not been prone to await
congressional action to resolve many of the questions left unanswered by these statutes, such as the nature of the cause of
action, apportionment of judgments, assignment, survival and
limitation^.'^^

It is of course true that the federal courts have done much
to fill in the interstices of the antitrust laws, both as to their
substantive meaning and as to procedural detail. As the Supreme Court recently observed in United States Gypsum Co.,
the Sherman Act, does not "precisely identify" the conduct
which it proscribes, but contains "generalized definitions" of the
conduct prohibited.'= Liability is determined with reference to
"open-ended and fact-specific standards like the 'rule of reason' " and the Act "has been construed to have a 'generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constiFor this reason,
tutional provisions.' "IM
The Sherman Act may be seen not as a prohibition of any
specific conduct but as a general authority to do what common
law courts usually do: to use certain customary techniques of
judicial reasoning, to consider the reasoning and results of
other common law courts, and to develop, refine, and innovate
in the dynamic common law tradition.lS6

Both the broad terms and the legislative history of the
Sherman Act support the implication of a broad delegation of
Congressional authority to the judiciary to define the substantive reach of that Act. No such implied delegation may fairly be
read into the detailed legislative prescription of antitrust
remedies.
Federal courts have also necessarily had to resolve questions
of procedural detail under the antitrust laws absent any express
congressional guidance. Such judicial law-making is illustrated
by Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,la6 in which
the Supreme Court adopted as a matter of federal common law
the rule that the release of one tortfeasor should not be held to
release the others unless it was intended to do
The Court
182. 594 F.2d at 1183.
183. 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978).
184. Id. at 438-39 (quoting Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,
359-60 (1933)).
ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS
46 (2d ed. 1974).
185. P. AREEDA,
186. 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
187. Id. at 342-46.
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declined to follow the "ancient common-law rule" that a release
of one released all others jointly liable regardless of intent because it viewed a rule adhering to the intent of the parties as the
"most consistent with the aims and purposes of the treble-damage remedy under the antitrust laws."1B8
As the Zenith Court implicitly recognized, the federal
courts would be abdicating the judicial function if they were to
take the position that they could give no answers to the myriads
of procedural issues that arise in the course of the administration of the antitrust laws except those with which Congress
failed to deal. For this reason, the courts have perceived that
even though the basic outlines and policies of those laws, both
substantive and procedural, must be resolved in the first instance by Congress, the judicial branch must be free to work out
the details in the individual case to comport, to the best of their
ability, with the aims and purposes of the antitrust laws and
remedies that Congress has provided. To acknowledge that general role, however, does little to resolve the specific issue under
consideration which is whether, applying "customary techniques
of judicial reasoning" and having an eye to the "aims and purposes of the treble-damage remedy," the courts should depart
from the existing common law to fashion a new right of contri- bution. In Zenith, proper policy from the standpoint of equity
bas apparent to the Court; there was no argument that the rule
adopted concerning the effect of a release of one of several antitrust conspirators might undermine the effectiveness of the private treble damage remedy. Resolution of the antitrust contribution issue is much more difficult.
For essentially the same reasons, the recent decision of the
Third Circuit in Glus v. G. C. Murphy Co.,lBefashioning a federal common law right of contribution in favor of an employer
held liable for sex discrimination in violation of title VII against
the unions that had agreed to the terms of an allegedly illegal
collective bargaining agreement, is not persuasive authority for
judicial creation of a right of contribution under the federal antitrust laws. Although there is no reason to gainsay that court's
recognition of the ability of federal courts to fashion law within
the interstices of a statutory scheme in appropriate circurnstances, none of the authorities cited in Glus dealt with situa188. Id. at 346.
189. 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1980).
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tions closely analogous to that under consideration here. Thus,
the antitrust contribution question is not one of fashioning a
private right of action to enforce a primary statutory duty where
the appropriate legislative materials indicate that such private
enforcement would effectuate congressional intent? It is one of
creating the primary duty itself where there is no suggestion of
any congressional intent to do so. Nor does the question involve
an implied delegation of judicial lawmaking authority such as
that determined by the United States Supreme Court to be implicit in the broad jurisdictional grant that was the subject of
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,lQ1or in the substantive
prohibitions of the antitrust laws themselves. This is not a case
of a broadly phrased grant of jurisdictional or substantive
power, but of the absence of any such delegation.
The Glus court recognized that it would be inappropriate,
in any case, to fashion a contribution right unless it could at
least be concluded that such a right would implement congressional intent.lQ2In Glus, the court of appeals believed that the
express terms of title VII "reflect a statutory policy that the responsibility for monetary relief should be borne by both unions
and employers to the extent that they are responsible for violations of Title VII,"lW and further that a right of contribution
would promote the conciliation objectives of the Act.lQ4In contrast, the courts have construed the liability provisions of the
Clayton Act to embody the historic princple of joint and several
liability, by which any one of several coconspirators may be held
liable for all damages caused by the conspiracy, and a contribution right would raise severe impediments to settlement in antitrust actions. It is also significant that violations of title VII may
be based entirely on discriminatory impact without any showing
of intent to dis~riminate,'~~
whereas many prevalent violations
of the antitrust laws such as price-fixing do involve intentional
and culpable misconduct as to which an equitable right of contribution would be inapproriate.
There is, in sum, no basis on which to conclude that a right
of contribution would effectuate, and substantial reason to be190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See id. at 255.
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
629 F.2d at 255.
Id. at 256 (emphasis added).

Id.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976).
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lieve that it could impair, the congressional purposes underlying
the private, treble-damage remedy in antitrust cases?

IV. CONCLUSION
It is inappropriate to expect Congress to resolve every problem of substantive and procedural detail that arises under the
antitrust laws or any scheme of statutory liability. Therefore, it
is generally recognized that the federal judiciary has an important role in fashioning federal common law where the terms of
the governing statute are silent. But the exercise of that role,
with its potential for impairing the primary policies that Congress has prescribed, calls for a more cautious and discriminating approach to the raw materials of judicial decision than was
adopted by the majority opinion in the Professional Beauty
Supply case.
In arguing for a right of contribution based on considerations of "fairness," the Professional Beauty court should have
given greater weight to the fact that the existing federal common
law denies any general right of contribution, and that contribution rights, whether of legislative or judicial origin, have arisen
primarily in the areas of negligence or unseaworthiness, areas
which do not provide an apt analogy to antitrust violations.
There has been no general recognition that considerations of
fairness and justice require that intentional wrongdoers such as
antitrust price-fixers be entitled to spread their losses.
A court should also bear in mind that perhaps the strongest
impetus for recognition of a right of antitrust contribution is the
claim that the existing statutory provision of joint and several
liability, particularly in the class action context, by creating
multi-million dollar damage exposure, creates "unfair settlement
196. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.91 (1972),cited by the Glus majority,
629 F.2d at 253, the primary issue was whether federal rather than state law should be
applied in resolving a claim that the pollution of interstate waters had created a public
nuisance. The Court's conclusion that federal law should apply was based on prior cases
within its original jurisdiction dealing with water disputes between states, in which the
application of the law of either of the contending states would have been inappropriate.
Id. at 101-07.There was no claim that the application of public nuisance princples would
be inconsistent with federal statutes in the area. To the contrary, the Court concluded
that such actions were within a savings clause of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. Id. at 104.
In contrast, there is no dispute that the antitrust contribution issue must be governed by federal rather than state law. But there are very substantial reasons to question
whether abandoning the long-standing federal common-law rule precluding contribution
would undermine the remedies that Congress has provided in the antitrust laws.
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pressure," and that the judiciary should guard against this alleged pressure by creating a species of "mandatory claim reduction" as a corollary of an underlying contribution right. Such
claim reduction, however, would seem inconsistent with the joint
and several liability that Congress has provided. And of equal
importance, the validity of the argument that unfair settlement
pressure is a serious problem turns largely on questions of empirical fact and legislative policy judgments which the federal
courts are ill equipped to make.
In addition, it would be inappropriate for a court to fashion
a new right of contribution under the antitrust laws as a matter
of federal common law unless it were able to say with considerably more assurance than would appear to be warranted that
such a right would not be inconsistent with the primary deterrent and compensatory policies underlying the private, trebledamage remedy that Congress has expressly provided.

